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In early December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a starkly different strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This contrast highlights the central feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—despite the fact that this squares with the new aerial operations in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a top U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative reinforced this, noting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This pivot is major, but experts warn it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Neglect and Strains

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Selective Intervention

A comparable standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have pushed the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

Similar to Rivals

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.